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{Criminology}
Why rape 
sHould Not (alWays) Be a criMe
forthcoming in Minnesota Law Review
professor of Law
aB, Harvard-Radcliffe College
Jd, University of Chicago Law School
K atharine Baker received her law degree (with honors) from the University of Chicago Law School, where she was a comments editor for the University of Chicago Law 
Review. After graduating, she clerked for the Honorable Edward R. Becker of the Third Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in philadelphia. From 1990 to 1993, she was a trial attorney with the 
Environmental Enforcement Section of the United States Department of Justice.
Most of professor Baker’s work focuses on issues pertaining to women. She has written ex-
tensively about sexual violence, in particular about the legal and social understandings of rape 
and sex. in recent years, she has focused more on family law issues, writing numerous articles 
on the interrelationships between legal, cultural, and biological constructions of parenthood, 
marriage, and family.
professor Baker has taught courses in environmental law, evidence, property, family law, 
gender, sexual orientation, and domestic violence. From 2001 to 2009, she was Associate Dean 
for Faculty Development. She has been a visiting professor at the University of pennsylvania 
Law School, Yale Law School, and northwestern Law School.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/kbaker.
Katharine K. Baker
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Shouldn’t rape, an act of bodily invasion that can trau-matize, endanger, and dehumanize its victims, be pun-ished as crime? For centuries, lawmakers, philosophers, 
legal theorists and women’s rights advocates have converged 
upon the criminal law as the appropriate vehicle to reflect soci-
ety’s opprobrium and inculcate norms against rape. This may be 
changing. in response to a broad and comprehensive enforce-
ment effort by the Department of Education (DOE), many 
universities are re-drafting their campus sexual assault policies 
so that sexual assault is treated as a form of sex discrimination. 
notwithstanding 20 centuries of treating rape as a criminal in-
jury, DOE has recast rape as a civil wrong—a discriminatory 
act. This article argues that by invoking a civil process, DOE 
is likely to meet with more success than the criminal law in re-
ducing the amount of nonconsensual sex. Once it does so, the 
norm of male entitlement that gives rise to so much criminal 
conduct may be destabilized enough to enable the criminal law 
as reformed to be enforced. 
The story of criminal rape law’s undoing begins with the rape 
reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s, which attempted 
A summary of Why Rape Should not (Always) Be a Crime, ___ Minnesota Law Review ___ 
(forthcoming).
Why Rape
Should not (Always) Be a Crime
By KatHariNe K. BaKer
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to have the criminal law take rape more 
seriously. The individual goals of different 
state rape reform movements were many 
and tactics varied, but one overriding 
goal, shared by virtually all reformers, 
was to expand the amount of criminally 
proscribed activity. Traditional rape law 
reflected a social norm that validated 
men’s entitlement to sex and allowed 
men to consistently ignore and override 
women’s will. By refusing to criminalize 
sexual activity coerced without force, and 
often perpetrated by men that women 
knew, the law sanctioned men’s routine 
appropriation of sex from women. The 
goal of rape reform was to make women’s 
willingness to have sex—her consent—
the centerpiece of the rape inquiry so that 
men would no longer feel so entitled to 
disregard a woman’s will in their attempt 
to get as much sex as they wanted. Be-
cause the male entitlement norm has not 
shifted sufficiently, DOE must now use a 
civil cause of action to combat what had 
been seen as a criminal problem.
T his article advances three overlapping but different reasons for why the 
criminal law has not been more successful 
in changing the social norms with regard 
to male entitlement to sex. First, the crim-
inal burden of proof makes norm trans-
formation exceedingly difficult. Making 
consent the determinative factor in rape 
does little good if proving the absence 
thereof—beyond a reasonable doubt, no 
less—is all but impossible. A law that de-
fines rape as nonconsensual sex may get 
the theory of rape right, but it ignores the 
overwhelming practical difficulty of prov-
ing non-consent in a context in which 
it is perfectly plausible to think that the 
act was consensual. This problem applies 
to a huge amount of sexual misconduct, 
whether secured through force or not. 
Victim credibility is crucial in the vast 
majority of rape cases, but the circum-
stances in which rapes occur and the sex-
ual nature of the crime make it likely that 
victims will be a bad witnesses. Most ac-
quaintance rapes involve people who have 
been drinking alcohol; thus their memo-
ries are likely to be fuzzy. Even without 
alcohol, rape victims tend to have fuzzier 
memories than victims of other types of 
traumatic or unpleasant experiences. in-
deed, blocking out the event from one’s 
memory has been found to be a healthy 
psychological response. it helps diminish 
the ongoing trauma that rape victims 
suffer. in other words, the healthier the 
victim, the worse she is as a witness.
This problem of having to rely so 
completely on the victim’s credibility has 
nothing to do with police or prosecutors 
not believing in the harms of acquain-
tance. it has little to do with women as a 
class not being believed. The problem is a 
crime that by its nature has no witnesses, 
produces no demonstrable evidence, and 
inevitably brings with it a perfectly plau-
sible theory of legality, i.e., consent. The 
crime also involves, indeed the essence of 
the injury stems from, an act that most 
people find very difficult to talk about. 
if no behavior is punished criminally be-
cause it cannot be proved, then the pub-
lic’s understanding of criminal behavior 
will not change. 
Second, competing constructions of 
“the rapist” undermined feminist attempts 
to de-normalize male predatory behavior. 
Tough-on-rapist measures enacted in the 
1990s reflect an understanding of rap-
ists as profoundly deviant and distinctly 
criminal. This pathological view of rape 
rejects the feminist insight at the core of 
much rape reform, which was that male 
appropriation of sex is commonplace and 
completely understandable given hetero-
sexual scripts and norms of sexual pursuit. 
Rape reformers knew this. They 
Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a Crime
knew that they were trying to unpack en-
trenched norms in gendered scripts that 
all too easily explained why acquaintance 
rape was so prevalent. They knew that 
they were indicting the status quo and 
trying to make it criminal. But even as 
these reformers were analyzing the likely 
problems with making the commonplace 
criminal, there was a competing, though 
superficially sympathetic, movement which 
sought to re-invigorate the notion that 
rapists—real rapists—were particularly 
dangerous. The result was a series of tough-
on-rapists initiatives—including registration 
and notification systems for convicted 
rapists, and both civil commitment rules 
and special evidence rules allowing prior 
act evidence in rape trials. in passing these 
rules Congress relied on demonstrably 
false stereotypes of rapists as uniquely 
pathological and distinctly recidivistic. 
it is surprising is how little resistance 
the tough-on-rapist movement encoun-
tered from feminists. it took less than 20 
years for most state legislatures first to 
override the traditional approach to rape 
in order to greatly expand the class of of-
fenses that might be criminalized as sexual 
assault, and second to institute unique 
forms of punishment that inevitably 
restricted the number of men whom the 
criminal justice system would be willing 
to classify as rapists. no one commented 
on the whiplash.
Third, rape reformers failed to appreci-
ate the delicate relationship between rape’s 
injury, victims’ agency, and the criminal 
law. in an effort to combat social norms 
that divested women of sexual agency, 
rape reform efforts asked all parties—vic-
tim, potential perpetrator, and jurors—to 
assume women lack agency; but women 
often resist being viewed this way. Raised 
to believe they have sexual agency even if 
research continues to confirm that they 
do not usually exercise it, young women 
today would rather see their failure to 
resist as an affirmative act that resulted in 
unwanted sex than see his failure to stop 
as the affirmative act that resulted in rape. 
Moreover, when rape is a crime against 
the state, enforcement of it necessarily 
inhibits a victim’s agency because the en-
forcement power and decision-making is 
vested in someone other than the victim. 
While this is true of all personal injury 
crimes, it is a particular problem with 
rape law if the essence of the injury is an 
affront to a victim’s autonomy and agency. 
Enforcing the crime thus tends to accen-
tuate rather than alleviate the injury to 
agency, and women consistently refuse to 
label their own experiences as rape, even if 
the criminal law would seem to. 
Women also repeatedly refuse to 
blame men. Victims are often uncom-
fortable labeling the men who were negli-
gent, recklessly indifferent with regard to 
consent, or even a bit forceful as rapists. 
Champions of the force requirement 
might use women’s reluctance to blame 
men as proof that rape requires force. 
“the criminal burden of proof makes norm 
transformation exceedingly difficult. Making consent 
the determinative factor in rape does little good if 
proving the absence thereof is all but impossible.”
Spring 2015 [ 5 ]
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As a theoretical matter, that reasoning is 
tautological, but as a practical matter, it is 
irrefutable. Women’s reluctance to blame 
men for rape comes from the lingering 
cultural confusion over what rape is. if ev-
eryone came to view the traditional sexual 
scripts as pernicious and outdated, like 
the rule of thumb for domestic violence, 
it would be much easier to blame men for 
proceeding without consent. As a practi-
cal matter, however, the power to expand 
the scope of behavior that can be defined 
as rape is inevitably in the hands of vic-
tims. if they believe in male entitlement, 
they will not be willing to punish the men 
who are just pursuing that to which they 
are entitled. DOE is policing predatory 
behavior, fostered by a norm of sexual 
entitlement, that disregards women’s will. 
R esistance to the new policies to date has come mostly from those unwill-
ing to see university procedures as distinct 
from the criminal law. Thus, critics either 
insist that the problem be addressed in 
the criminal system, or they insist that 
universities provide criminal law safe-
guards for those accused. But the offense 
that many men on college campuses are 
being accused of is not rape. it is discrim-
inatory conduct. if found responsible for 
such conduct, the men should not be 
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people are still not ready to call most men 
who secure sex without consent “rapists,” 
DOE and universities must be careful not 
to allow people to conflate what DOE is 
prohibiting with rape.  ■ 




a History of legal aid
published by Cambridge University press
professor of Law
Associate Dean of Faculty
F elice Batlan is both subject and scholar in the field of women’s legal history. Her nine years of practical legal experience supplement her rigorous academic career, in which she 
has published and presented extensively on the topics of legal history, women in the legal pro-
fession, and feminist legal theory—occasionally appearing alongside such prominent feminist 
figures as gloria Steinem. She is the author of Women and Justice for the poor: A History 
of Legal Aid, 1863–1945, just published by Cambridge University press.
After law school, professor Batlan clerked for the Honorable Constance Baker Motley 
of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of new York and then worked as a law 
firm associate specializing in securities law and financial markets. She then joined greenwich 
natWest as associate general counsel and head of global compliance. Eventually she returned 
to the academic world, completing a ph.D. in U.S. history from new York University.
professor Batlan has immersed herself in a wide variety of subjects spanning law, financial 
regulation, and the humanities, serving as both director of the institute for Compliance and 
co-director of the institute for Law and the Humanities. Her teaching areas include U.S. legal 
history, gender and the law, feminist jurisprudence, corporations, business organizations, secu-
rities regulation, and contracts. She has taught courses internationally in Sienna, paris, guang-
zhou, Shanghai, Beijing, and Bangkok. She received Chicago-Kent’s Excellence in Teaching 
Award in 2009 and iiT’s Julia Beveridge Award for service to women students in 2008.
professor Batlan is an associate editor and book review editor for the prestigious Law and 
History Review. previously she has performed editorial duties for Continuity and Change, 
and for the Macmillan-gale Encyclopedia of the Supreme Court of the United States. As 
a historian, she has served as both a consultant and a member of the Accession Committee for 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Historical Society.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/fbatlan.
Felice Batlan
Ba, Smith College
Jd, Harvard Law School
Phd, new York University
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T his book began in new Orleans amid the debris and destruction of Hurricane Katrina. in 2005, when the storm struck, i was living in new Orleans and 
teaching at Tulane University. The weeks after the storm were 
a confusing jumble of friends’ couches, searches for cloth-
ing, and a growing sense that this would not end soon. Do-
ing something in new Orleans seemed better than passively 
watching the continuing disaster on Cnn, so i moved back 
into my damaged but still standing home. As someone living 
in new Orleans when much of the city was unoccupied and 
in ruins, i received constant calls from acquaintances, friends, 
and friends of friends who were unable to return to the city. 
people needed help with insurance forms and mortgages, with 
locating relatives, procuring housing, finding documents, and, 
above all else, dealing with the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA) and its arbitrary and changing policies 
and procedures. in the wake of such an enormous catastrophe 
and the haphazard response by the government, many people 
needed a witness and advocate on the ground.
FEMA established a series of disaster recovery centers in
A excerpt from Women and Justice for the Poor: A History of Legal Aid, 1863–1945 (Cambridge 
University press 2015).
Women & Justice
for the poor: A History of Legal Aid
By felice BatlaN
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and around new Orleans that were in-
tended to function as “supermarkets” for 
hurricane aid. in these centers, victims 
could apply for FEMA benefits; procure 
information on repairing a roof; speak 
to the Army Corps of Engineers; receive 
a disaster tax rebate; find a Bible, a hot 
meal, a friendly ear. in theory, the centers 
were an excellent idea; in practice, they 
resulted in hundreds of people waiting in 
long lines for hour after hour. One day i 
approached a FEMA manager, handed her 
my resume, and asked if i could set up a 
legal-information booth. She allowed me 
to do so without asking a single question. 
The “booth” consisted of a folding table 
and my cell phone. i organized a handful 
of attorney friends, and we staffed our 
station six days a week for two months.
i noticed that of the thousands of 
people who stopped by, few needed any-
thing that i understood to be legal advice. 
A series of complicated emergency rules 
temporarily allowed volunteer attorneys 
like myself to practice law. Yet i had no 
clear understanding of whether i was cov-
ered by those rules or for whom i worked. 
nor did i have the resources or expertise 
to practice law in any traditional sense. 
instead, i functioned as a sort of media-
tor, personal advocate, legal educator, and 
social worker.
people came to our booth because 
they were desperately frustrated and 
needed help in whatever form it would 
come. Often i mediated between FEMA 
representatives and people applying for 
benefits, and tried to understand how 
FEMA was interpreting its ever-changing 
rules. i informed inexperienced FEMA 
workers what the agency’s policies were on 
that day, and alerted FEMA employees, 
all working in the same room, that they 
were interpreting policy in diametrically 
opposed ways. Most of all, i listened to 
people’s stories, as the storm produced 
as many stories as there were survivors. 
narrating their stories seemed crucial to 
those who were trying to process events 
that had happened so quickly. 
This work made me reflect on what 
i was doing and whether i was using my 
legal knowledge, legal skill, or anything 
else that i had learned in law school or 
during my decade as a legal practitioner. 
in the FEMA center, law and social work 
bled together. My work seemed similar to 
that performed by many women’s orga-
nizations in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. My legal-assistance 
project made me reflect broadly on volun-
teer work, charity, lawyers, social workers, 
and the ambiguities of what the practice 
of law means in an environment of mas-
sive and aching need.
T he development of organized free legal aid for the poor in the United 
States has a rich history that has been 
overlooked, even buried. Women and 
Justice for the Poor uncovers the enormous 
role played by women as legal aid provid-
“Women and Justice for the Poor uncovers the 
enormous role played by women as legal aid 
providers and explores how ideologies of gender 
shaped legal aid.”
Women and Justice for the Poor
ers in the late nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. it explores how ideologies 
of gender shaped and constructed what 
legal aid was and who would be its pro-
viders and clients. The book exposes the 
“real” history of legal aid, a story that the 
predominantly male leaders in the field of 
legal aid intentionally masked.
During the late nineteenth century 
women’s organizations pioneered the 
provision of legal aid in major cities such 
as new York, Boston, Chicago, and phila-
delphia. Although the actual everyday de-
livery of such aid was carried out primarily 
by upper- and middle-class women who 
were not professional lawyers, their work 
eventually created a female and feminized 
“dominion” of legal aid. These early orga-
nizations specialized in claims on behalf 
of poor women—first addressing mostly 
wage claims against employers and then 
expanding to domestic relations cases and 
other legal problems. Such organizations 
defined legal assistance broadly, to include 
multiple kinds of advice as well as the pro-
vision of material aid. They also situated 
legal assistance within a wider agenda that 
included equality for women in the work-
place, the home, and the public sphere. 
As practiced by women’s organizations, 
the provision of legal aid intentionally 
entailed the legal equivalent of a laying 
on of hands. That is, the connections and 
interactions between poor women and 
women lay lawyers, they believed, helped 
heal class rifts, and they took place in an 
environment in which poor women could 
freely tell their stories. With time and ex-
perience, women lay lawyers acquired le-
gal knowledge and positioned themselves 
as experts in the law, a stance that some 
male lawyers, and judges, accepted and 
even respected.
Following the creation of women’s le-
gal aid organizations, a second generation 
of legal aid associations developed in the 
late nineteenth and the early twentieth 
century. These societies generally were 
controlled by professional male lawyers, 
“The Waiting-Room in the Building of the Workingwoman’s 
Protective Union,” illustration by Georgina A. Davis. From 
Frank Leslie’s illustrated newspaper, Feb. 5, 1881. Courtesy 
of Felice Batlan. Spring 2015 [ 11 ]
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and they provided legal assistance to both 
men and women. As a number of male 
legal aid lawyers gained prominence, they 
sought to professionalize legal aid and 
transform it from its status as a charity—
with its female dominion of lay lawyers—
to something more akin to the private 
practice of law.
These new legal aid leaders redrew 
the conventional image of the legal aid 
client; rather than a poor woman with a 
domestic relations claim, the client was 
now a working man with a wage claim. 
Such manly clients were entitled to legal 
aid as a means to establish their indepen-
dence. Many clients of second-generation 
legal aid societies were immigrants, and 
attorneys imagined that the provision of 
legal assistance to these men served as a 
lesson in citizenship. This process of re-
configuring legal aid obscured women’s 
presence as clients, lay lawyers, and even 
professional lawyers. Moreover, new le-
gal aid organizations began to reject the 
types of claims, especially those involving 
domestic relations, that women typically 
sought to bring.
By the early 1920s, male leaders in le-
gal aid panicked over issues of gender, au-
thority, expertise, and professionalization. 
The resulting controversy raised questions 
about what constituted the practice law, 
what the rule of law meant, what was a 
legal problem, what types of services le-
gal aid should provide, and which clients 
legal aid should serve. Central to these 
issues was a fundamental question: Was 
legal aid meant to offer a process-based 
form of justice by allowing access to an 
FelICe Batlan
seleCted PuBlICatIons
articles and contributions to Books
Legal Aid, Women Lay Lawyers, and the Rewrit-
ing of History, 1863–1930, in Feminist Legal His-
tory: Essays on Women and Law (T. Thomas & T. 
Boisseau eds., nYU press 2011).
“if You Become His Second Wife, You Are a 
Fool”: Shifting paradigms of the Roles, percep-
tions, and Working Conditions of Legal Secretar-
ies in Large Law Firms, 52 Studies in Law, Politics 
and Society 169 (2010).
The Birth of Legal Aid: gender ideologies, Wom-
en, and the Bar in new York City, 1863–1910, 
28 Law and History Review 931 (2010).
not Our Mother’s Law School?: A Third-Wave 
Feminist Study of Women’s Experiences in Law 
School, 39 University of Baltimore Law Forum 
124 (2009) (with K. Hradsky, K. Jeschke, L. 
Meyer & J. Roberts).
The Ladies Health protective Association: Lay 
Lawyers and Urban Cause Lawyering, 41 Akron 
Law Review 701 (2008).
Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State power, 
and Quarantine past and Future, 80 Temple Law 
Review 53 (2007).
Law and the Fabric of the Everyday: Settlement 
Houses, Sociological Jurisprudence, and the gen-
dering of Urban Legal Culture, 15 Southern Cal-
ifornia Interdisciplinary Law Journal 235 (2006).
attorney, or was it intended to create sub-
stantive justice? Although scholars of legal 
aid have long pointed to its conservative 
nature, lay lawyers presented an alterna-
tive, more expansive version of legal aid 
based on ideas of social justice.  ■ 
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M ichael Spak served on active duty with the U.S. Army in the Judge Advocate general’s Corps from 1963 to 1969 and has remained in the U.S. Army Reserves. As Colonel 
Spak, he is currently liaison officer of the Judge Advocate general’s School, Charlottesville, 
Virginia, for a seven-state area.
professor Spak joined iiT Chicago-Kent as a professor in 1974. He has also taught at 
Depaul University, St. Louis University, and the University of Maryland. At Chicago-Kent, 
he teaches courses in the commercial law area.
professor Spak is the author of numerous books, including Cases and Materials on 
Military Justice, as well as more than four dozen law review articles. He has been professor-
reporter on the Uniform Commercial Code Committee, illinois Judicial Conference, and other 
publications. For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/mspak.
Jonathan P. Tomes is president of Veterans press, inc., and EMR Legal, inc., a nationwide HipAA consulting firm based 
in Kansas City, and is a retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S. 
Army Judge Advocate general’s Corps. He was a visiting profes-
sor at iiT Chicago-Kent from 1988 to 1994.
Professor of Law
Ba, Depaul University
Jd, Depaul University College of Law
llM, northwestern University School of Law
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professor Michael i. Spak and Jonathan p. Tomes have written extensively on the issue of whether the military justice system can properly handle sexual ha-
rassment and other sex offenses by servicemembers against 
other servicemembers, even before the current uproar occa-
sioned by the rise in sexual assaults in recent years and pro-
posed legislation by Senator Kirsten gillibrand, D-n.Y., which 
would remove commanders from the decision-making process 
in such prosecutions. professor Spak, a retired colonel in the 
U.S. Army Judge Advocate general’s Corps, believes that we 
should eliminate the entire military justice system, with the 
exception of relatively minor, purely military offenses. His po-
sition is as follows: (1) simply abolish the entire “convening 
authority” military justice system, with its inherent conflicts of 
interests, replacing it with whatever civilian jurisdictions would 
otherwise attach, but (2) keep the military system for minor, 
purely military offenses. Attorney Jonathan p. Tomes, a retired 
lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Judge Advocate general’s 
Corps and former infantry and military intelligence officer 
who has served in combat, does not have quite such a radical
A summary of practical problems with Modifying the Military Justice System to Better Handle
Sexual Assault Cases, 29 Wisconsin Journal of Law, Gender & Society 377 (2015).
By MicHael i. sPaK aNd JoNatHaN P. toMes
pRactical pRoBlems
with Modifying the Military Justice System
to Better Handle Sexual Assault Cases
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view, but agrees that problems exist in 
the system, particularly in the area of sex 
crimes.
politicians and military members have 
been very vocal in espousing their views 
on this matter, but what is conspicuously 
absent is a thorough discussion of the 
necessity for and the practical problems 
inherent in either turning all prosecutions 
for sex crimes over to civilian authorities 
or removing the commander from the 
decision-making process altogether—as 
suggested by Senator gillibrand’s legisla-
tion, which would remove commanders 
from the process of deciding whether se-
rious crimes, including sexual misconduct 
cases, go to trial. Under her proposed leg-
islation, that judgment would rest instead 
with seasoned trial lawyers who have pros-
ecutorial experience and hold the rank of 
colonel or above. Her bill also would take 
away a commander’s authority to convene 
a court-martial. That responsibility would 
be given to a new and separate office out-
side the victim’s chain of command.
Sounds good, right? Statistics certain-
ly document an increase in military sex 
crimes recently, but they also document 
increases in suicides and post-traumatic 
stress disorder cases likely due to the in-
creased combat rotations of “overseas con-
tingency operations.” nor do we have a 
good handle on the percentage of civilian 
sexual assaults that are actually reported, 
prosecuted, result in convictions, and 
result in incarceration of the offender. it 
would not be surprising if the military 
had a higher conviction and incarceration 
rate than civilian jurisdictions.
Further, practical problems exist, 
not all of which favor the servicemember 
accused of some form of sexual assault. 
Some courts-martial protections protect 
the victim. For example, does Military 
Rule of Evidence 412, the military’s ver-
sion of the Rape-Shield Law, afford more 
protection than a state’s or the federal 
government’s version? And which would 
prevail in a state court trial?
The potential problems exist in juris-
dictional issues, substantive law and pro-
cedural issues, rights of accused service-
members and alleged victims, and practical/
economic areas.
W ith regard to jurisdiction, courts-martial have jurisdiction over all 
violations of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ) worldwide and many 
U.S. civilian crimes as well, by virtue of 
Article 134, UCMJ, which uses the Assim-
ilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. 13, to make 
civilian crimes military offenses. What 
happens if we remove court-martial juris-
diction from military sex crimes? Who has 
jurisdiction? The jurisdiction of the situs 
of the crime? Kansas, if the sex crime oc-
curred at Fort Riley, Kansas? Korea, if the 
crime occurred on Osan Air Force Base? 
god knows who if the crime occurred in 
Somalia or a Taliban-controlled area of 
Afghanistan? Some federal court created 
to handle such extra-territorial sex crime 
offenses? note that many federal laws do 
not have extra-territorial jurisdiction.
Such a change in court-martial ju-
risdiction would require re-negotiation 
of Status of Forces Agreements, which, 
among others, specify whether the host 
nation or the visiting nation (in this case, 
the United States) has jurisdiction over an 
“can the military justice
system properly handle
sexual harassment and
other sex offenses by service-
members against other
servicemembers?”
Practial Problems with Modifying the Military Justice System
offense. Typically, such agreements pro-
vide that the host country has exclusive 
jurisdiction over offenses that violate the 
host nation’s laws, but not those of the 
visiting nation. The visiting nation has 
exclusive jurisdiction over offenses that 
violate its laws but not those of the host 
nation. it does not, for example, violate 
Korean law for a U.S. airman to go absent 
without leave (“AWOL”). Both nations 
have concurrent jurisdiction when the 
offense violates the laws of both coun-
tries, with the country that the victim is 
a national of having primary concurrent 
jurisdiction.
Even within the United States, juris-
dictional problems exist. Military bases, 
like other federal lands, have three types 
of jurisdiction: exclusive, concurrent, and 
proprietary use. The latter is where the 
federal government has no jurisdiction—
it all resides in the state in which the base 
is located. Unless the federal government 
cedes exclusive jurisdiction over military 
sex crimes and the state accepts it, the state 
has no jurisdiction. And why would a state 
want jurisdiction over military sex crimes 
committed on a military installation?
As to the procedural problems, in 
such cases, what law applies? is an italian 
court going to apply the UCMJ and its 
protections for accused servicemembers? 
is a French court going to apply the 
military’s definition of sexual harass-
ment? Even though the UCMJ does not 
provide for jury trials, it does have a mil-
itary equivalent in a court composed of 
members. How is this right afforded in 
a civil law trial presided over by a panel 
of judges? Will the UCMJ’s right to free 
counsel be eviscerated by a civilian trial? 
And what is the protection for the victim 
if the trial is held in Afghanistan and its 
Sharia law requires four eyewitnesses to 
convict someone of rape? And is the vic-
tim exempt from being stoned to death 
for adultery if the rapist is acquitted?
With regard to practical and econom-
ic problems, amending the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts by empowering them to 
prosecute military sexual assaults may be 
the answer. But amending federal court 
jurisdiction and the UCMJ may be im-
possible in this bitterly divided Congress.
Who is going to fund these prosecu-
tions? in one case that one of the authors 
is familiar with, the travel costs to bring 
witnesses from all over the world where 
they had been reassigned was approxi-
mately $100,000. Further, the military 
does not have to pay its expert witness 
military physicians expert witness fees or 
fly them first class, but a state or federal 
court may have to.
What about bail? Military law does 
not have a right to bail. Rather, the 
military judge or magistrate determines 
whether the accused is a flight risk or a 
threat and whether a lesser form of re-
straint than pretrial confinement, such as 
arrest in quarters or restriction to specified 
limits, would suffice. But a civilian court 
may grant bail, which would, even despite 
restrictions—such as no contact with the 
victim or witnesses—free up the alleged 
offender to threaten or harm the victim or 
witnesses or commit other crimes.
Further, military courts-martial have 
much stricter speedy trial rules than do 
civilian courts. Are victims going to be 
pleased with their cases being dragged 
out for months or years as opposed to the 
six months or less of the vast majority of 
courts-martial?
Also, where are convicted military 
sex offenders going to be confined? The 
military’s prisons, such as the U.S. Dis-
ciplinary Barracks (USDB), or federal or 
state prisons? And who is going to fund 
civilian prisons, which may already be 
overcrowded and underfunded? no mili-
tary prisoners have yet been released from 
Spring 2015 [ 17 ]
[ 18 ]  IIT ChICago-KenT FaCulTy PersPeCTIves
Michael I. Spak
the USDB, for example, as a result of a 
judge’s order because of overcrowding.
And the foregoing does not even take 
into account the law of unintended con-
sequences. For example, for all we know, 
victims will be even less willing to report 
sex crimes knowing that their case will be 
dragged through a civilian system.
none of the above discussion is in-
tended to place insurmountable barriers 
to addressing this problem. But what no 
one needs, least of all the victims of such 
crimes, is a knee-jerk reaction that does 
not thoroughly consider how to address 
these practical problems and whether ci-
vilian courts will actually be a better way 
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in recent years, a conservative majority of the Supreme Court has issued a raft of decisions that have cheered the right and dismayed the left. To name only a few cases, 
District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) declared that the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to own firearms. 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n (2010) and Mc-
Cutcheon v. Federal Election Comm’n (2014) struck down key 
limitations on the ability of corporations and wealthy individ-
uals to dominate the political process. And Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby (2014) held that, under the quasi-constitutional Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, family-owned corpo-
rations have a right to religious liberty which permits them to 
deny contraceptive coverage to their female employees.
Decisions like these clearly align with the political attitudes 
of the justices. But i believe that these decisions also can be un-
derstood to reflect a deeper political and constitutional theory. 
To see this point, it is important to recognize that the conser-
vative view of the Constitution is not monolithic, but includes 
two different strands. The first strand is a traditional conservative 
A summary of The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 117 
West Virginia Law Review 231 (2014), a revised and expanded version of the Third Annual C. 
Edwin Baker Lecture for Liberty, Equality, and Democracy, presented by the author at West 
Virginia University College of Law in April 2014.
By steveN J. HeyMaN
the conseRvative-
liBeRtaRian tuRn
in First Amendment Jurisprudence
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position which supports the government’s 
authority to enforce law and order and 
to promote traditional moral and social 
values. This strand can be seen in recent 
decisions in which the Court has made it 
more difficult to sue the government and 
its officials, restricted the rights of crimi-
nal defendants, limited the constitutional 
right to privacy, and lowered the wall of 
separation between church and state. 
in contrast, the second strand of con-
servative constitutionalism is a libertar-
ian position which emphasizes the need 
to protect individual freedom against 
government regulation. This position is 
rooted in a conception of the person as a 
separate and independent individual who 
is entitled to pursue his own aims so long 
as he does not injure others. Society is an 
aggregation of individuals, and the state is 
a necessary evil—an external force that is 
needed to protect individuals against one 
another, but which itself poses a serious 
threat to freedom. The Constitution is 
designed to protect the negative liberty 
of individuals against invasion by the 
government. it is this libertarian strand 
of conservative thought that accounts 
for the decisions on gun ownership, 
campaign spending, and religious liberty 
that i mentioned above. This strand also 
underlies other recent decisions that ex-
pand protection for property rights, cut 
back on affirmative action, and impose 
limits on the welfare state and the power 
of the federal government—most notably 
National Federation of Independent Busi-
ness v. Sebelius (2012), in which the five 
conservative justices ruled that Congress 
had no power to adopt the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA) under the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution. (The ACA 
survived only because Chief Justice John 
g. Roberts, Jr., joined the four liberals 
in holding that the law could be upheld 
under Congress’s power to tax.)
As Citizens United and McCutcheon 
show, this libertarian strand of conserva-
tive ideology has also become one of the 
most powerful currents in contemporary 
First Amendment jurisprudence. A lead-
ing case is American Booksellers Ass’n v. 
Hudnut (7th Cir. 1985), which struck 
down a feminist anti-pornography ordi-
nance. Judge Frank H. Easterbrook ruled 
that the state may regulate sexually explic-
it material to protect traditional morality, 
but not to promote gender equality—a 
rationale that he condemned as a form of 
authoritarian “thought control.” Likewise, 
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia treated a city’s ban on 
cross-burning as an impermissible effort 
to impose political correctness by pun-
ishing the expression of racist ideas. And 
in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist ruled 
that the First Amendment right to free-
dom of association permitted the Scouts 
to deny membership to gay persons on 
moral grounds. in all of these cases—most 
of which were decided by a vote of five to 
four—conservative judges have used the 
First Amendment to protect their con-
ception of individual liberty against laws 
that sought to promote social values like 
dignity, equality, and community.
T he conservative-libertarian approach has made some valuable contribu-
tions to First Amendment jurisprudence. 
For example, i believe that the conser-
vative justices are right to hold in cases 
like Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the 
University of Virginia (1995) that public 
schools and universities may not discrim-
inate against religious speakers, but must 
grant them the same rights and benefits 
that they afford to other speakers. The 
libertarian outlook of the conservative 
justices also may have helped to prevent 
a recurrence after 9/11 of the official 
The Conservative-Libertarian Turn in First Amendment Jurisprudence
suppression of radical speech that marred 
American law during the Cold War era. 
Yet i also believe that the conser-
vative-libertarian approach to the First 
Amendment has some serious flaws. The 
first problem is that cases like Citizens 
United and McCutcheon draw too close a 
connection between free speech and prop-
erty rights, and fail to recognize the ways 
that unconstrained political spending and 
contributions can distort and undermine 
the democratic process. Second, decisions 
like Hudnut and R.A.V. extend too much 
protection to speech that injures, abus-
es, or degrades other people. Third, the 
judges whom we are discussing tend to be 
social conservatives as well as libertarians, 
and deep problems arise when these two 
aspects of conservative thought collide 
with one another, as they have in recent 
cases involving animal cruelty, violent 
video games, and internet pornography. 
Fourth, by upholding traditional restric-
tions on expression, such as the obscenity 
doctrine, while striking down regulations 
that reflect liberal or progressive values, 
the conservative-libertarian approach fails 
to satisfy its own demand for ideological 
neutrality. And finally, the conserva-
tive-libertarian commitment to protecting 
free speech against the government focus-
es on individuals within the private sphere 
and not on those within governmental in-
stitutions. As a result, the approach tends 
to deny protection to those groups who 
are most vulnerable to state control, such 
as prisoners, public employees, and those 
who serve in the military.
T he root problem is that the conser-vative-libertarian approach is based 
on an overly narrow and one-sided view 
of the self—a view that stresses the ways 
in which we are separate and independent 
individuals, but that fails to adequately 
recognize the social dimension of human 
life. We need to develop an approach to 
the First Amendment that is based on a 
broader and richer conception of the self, 
the society, and the nature of constitution-
al freedom. i call this approach liberal hu-
manism. Like conservative libertarianism, 
this view stresses the value of liberty. But 
it understands liberty not merely in nega-
tive terms—as freedom from government 
intrusion or regulation—but also in more 
positive terms, as the capacity to pursue 
the full development and realization of 
the self, through one’s own individual ac-
tivities as well as through social relation-
ships and participation in the community. 
On this view, there is no inherent conflict 
between the value of individual liberty 
and social values such as dignity, equality, 
and community. instead, the law should 
seek to reconcile all of these values with 
one another.
Free speech has both an individual 
and a social dimension: when individuals 
communicate with one another, they not 
only are engaging in self-expression but 
also are participating in a form of social 
“We need to develop an approach to the first 
amendment that is based on a broader and richer 
conception of the self, the society, and the nature 
of constitutional freedom.”
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interaction. it follows that the right to free 
speech carries with it a duty to respect the 
personality of others and their status as 
members of the community. For this rea-
son, i would argue that the law should be 
allowed to impose reasonable restrictions 
on speech that injures, abuses, or degrades 
other people, including some forms of 
racist hate speech and violent pornogra-
phy. Similarly, the right to free association 
should not necessarily empower groups 
that play a central role in the community, 
such as the Boy Scouts, to exclude indi-
viduals on invidious grounds like sexual 
orientation. Finally, the liberal-humanist 
view conceives of political speech as dem-
ocratic deliberation among free and equal 
citizens, and thus would support some 
restrictions on activity that undermines 
our ability to engage in that process, such 
as unlimited electoral spending by corpo-
rations and wealthy individuals. in this 
way, we can reconcile First Amendment 
freedoms with other values that are essen-
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